FIP0047: PoRep Bug Policy

Add a ProofExpiration parameter to each sector, and describes a policy to be adopted in case a flaw is discovered in the theory or implementation of proof-of-replication (PoRep).

We are not aware of any PoRep issues at this time, but it is crucial to have a plan to deal with any possibility. This proposal introduces a concrete mechanism for processing all sectors, and describes (but does not implement) a policy that uses the mechanism.

The Filecoin network uses cryptographic techniques to provide assurance of the physical uniqueness of sectors of data (proof of replication, or PoRep) and their ongoing availability (proof of space-time, PoSt). These mechanisms provide the proof of resources underlying the blockchain’s security (in addition to the security offered by pledge collateral stake). Some of the cryptography involved has been developed relatively recently. It is possible that there are errors in either the theory or implementation, or that errors may be introduced one day, that undermine the desired assurances. The result of such an error would most likely be that storage providers could “cheat” the network to claim they were maintaining more committed storage than they in fact possessed. This would reduce network security as consensus power could be gained without the expected physical infrastructure commitment. It is also unfair to non-cheating providers, assuming knowledge of the flaw was limited. In the case of an error in PoRep, it is likely that there would be no possible protocol change that could detect the cheating sectors after commitment.

This situation has already arisen once in the life of the Filecoin network. The v1.1 PoRep algorithm patched a bug in the v1 PoRep implementation that weakened the security assurances of sectors. The bug was responsibly reported to the Filecoin team and it is unknown if it was ever exploited by a provider. We are not aware of any similar bugs at this time. Filecoin storage is secure as far as we can ascertain.

The network today has an implicit policy on what to do if another such bug is detected:

The policy might thus be summarised as: put up with the potentially-insecure power for a limited period of time, but retain existing commitments of providers to the network and vice-versa. The 1.5-year window was selected as a compromise: a longer maximum commitment would be beneficial for storage stability, but a shorter bound improves the response time in case of a bug.

This policy depends on the 1.5y commitment expiration, and would lose effectiveness if the maximum commitment duration were raised.

The sector commitment duration (currently 1.5 years) is the period availability a provider commits to when first proving a sector. When a sector is close to expiration, a provider can extend the sector for up to the same duration again. This can be repeated until the sector maximum lifetime (currently 5 years), after which further extensions are prohibited.

It would be desirable to allow storage providers to make longer commitments to sectors (e.g. as proposed in FIP-0036). Longer commitments support stability of network’s committed storage, could immediately support longer deals, and generally reduce the overheads of cycling sectors into the future. A higher possible maximum commitment duration would be beneficial regardless of any incentives toward longer commitments.

The authors assert that the implementation of a concrete mechanism, and rough consensus around policy, should be pre-requisite to increasing the maximum sector commitment duration.

This mechanism is implemented by adapting the existing expiration queue mechanism in the miner actor to schedule sectors according to the earlier of their proof expiration or commitment expiration.

If we were to discover a flaw in PoRep theory or implementation:

This proposal requires implementing the proof expiration mechanism, but does not require implementing the sector replacement mechanism until such time as it’s needed. Details of that mechanism may depend on the new PoRep algorithm.

However, acceptance of this proposal should be considered as ratification of this policy in general, so that emergency-response implementers can immediately design towards it.

During migration at network upgrade, each sector’s ProofExpiration is set to that value it would have if it had initially been set to SectorActiviation + MaxProofDuration and then refreshed until the proof expiration is no less than the commitment expiration.

Decoupling of sector commitment duration from proof duration allow providers to make long sector commitments (see FIP0036) without comprising the possibility of executing an “emergency” PoRep algorithm upgrade. The mechanism of explicit proof refresh must be implemented prior to recognizing any sectors with longer commitments, because it would be generally infeasible to schedule an orderly iteration over all sectors after the fact. This design implements a way to cycle over all sectors every 1.5 years. Note that, in response to a serious PoRep flaw, it would be possible to speed up the cycling by processing the proof expiration queue faster than 1 epoch per epoch.

A sector’s ProofExpiration epoch is strictly derived from its activation epoch in order to spread expirations out relatively evenly, and with limited opportunity for storage providers to overload the network by scheduling them all at once.

The cost of this approach is approximately the same as the existing process for extending sector expirations every 1.5 years.

This proposal also outlines the policy for a disaster-response upgrade in order to align the community on a carefully designed plan and establish a foundation for a smooth network upgrade in the event of discovery of an insecure PoRep. The proposed Policy disallows extending the proof duration for any sectors sealed with vulnerable code in order to have the power attributed to insecure sectors decreases gradually as their proof validities expire. On the other side, sealing new secure sectors in order to maintain power is allowed by the replacement sealing and incetivized by applying a fee for sectors that are not replaced.

We hope that broad policy agreement now can facilitate smooth governance in response to any future emergency.

This upgrade changes the schema for sectors and the miner expiration queue, and thus requires a network upgrade and sector state migration.

Impact on tooling should be minimal beyond changes to sector management software.

(Will be) Included with changes to builtin actors, see #PR#.

Decoupling sector proof expiration from their commitment duration allows longer commitment durations without compromising the network’s ability to respond to flaws in PoRep.

If a flaw is discovered, an increased commitment duration would create the need for replacement sealing, or penalties for non-replaced sectors.

To be finished: describe the cryptoecon modelling and the simulation outcome

This proposal does not adjust incentives for providers or clients, but it does make longer sector commitments possible. Other proposals may then introduce incentives for such commitments.

If the maximum sector commitment duration is increased, then a sector committed for longer than its initial proof expiration must be refreshed, or it will be terminated with a penalty. This is a different operational position than a sector committed only as as long as the proof duration, and then extended. In the latter case, because the sector was not committed to a longer period, no termination penalty is applied if the extension is missed. Committing a sector for longer than the initial proof duration thereby introduces some operational risk to the provider, which must remember to and succeed in refreshing the proof within the refresh window.

The CommitmentExpiration and ProofExpiration separation implementation is available TBC.

The replacement sealing implementation is deferred until needed.

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